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1 - Aim of the study  
 
The aim of this study is to provide a conceptual theoretical framework of 
the right of patients to refuse medical treatments on religious grounds and 
on the (supposed) right to the parents to refuse medical treatments on 
behalf of their children. A comparative approach has been used in order to 
compare and contrast the essential normative divergences and similarities 
between the English (and Welsh) and Italian legal systems. It is beyond the 
scope of this study to examine the right of conscientious refusal - claimed 
by doctors and paramedics (and sometimes recognised by the State) - to 
provide professionally accepted health care goods and services1. 
This study will focus on three main issues. The first deals with the 
definitions of “medical treatment”, “refusal” and “religious grounds”; the 
second issue is devoted to showing links and connections between the 
freedom of religion, the right to self-determination and the right to refuse 
medical treatment based on religious motivations; finally, the third issue 
will take into account legitimate limitations on the right to refuse medical 
treatments on religious grounds. 
 
                                                          
* Article peer reviewed. 
 
1 M.R. WICCLAIR, Managing conscientious objection in health care institutions, in (2014) 
HEC Forum. An Interdisciplinary Journal on Hospitals' Ethical and Legal Issues, 2014, 26(3), 267-
83. 
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2 - Defining medical treatment 
 
While a variety of definitions of the term “Medical Treatment” have been 
suggested, this paper will start with the definition suggested by Dorland’s 
Medical Dictionary, which sees it as “the management and care of a patient 
for the purpose of combating disease, injury, or disorder”2. 
The American Heritage Medical Dictionary suggests a similar 
definition: A “Medical Treatment” is every “administration or application 
of remedies to a patient or for a disease or an injury; a medicinal or surgical 
management; a therapy”3. These are medical definitions, and they are not 
legally binding. But they constitute the pillar on which the legal definition 
has been built. 
In the English legal system, the main general legal definition of 
treatment can be found in section 64 of the 2005 Mental Capacity Act: The 
concept of “medical treatment” includes a diagnostic or other procedure (in 
a medical context), and it appears strictly linked to every medical practice 
directed toward combatting a disease, an injury or a disorder. In the case A 
London Local Authority v JH & Anor, District Judge Eldergill emphasised that 
the definition of treatment – in the context of the Mental Capacity Act - is 
actually very broad4: The letter of the law seems to suggest that it must be 
intended to be wider than the definition given by Minister of Health v General 
Committee of the Royal Midland Counties Home for Incurables at Leamington Spa 
Chancery Division, 9 December 1953, in which Mr.Vasey described the word 
“treatment” as every “process directed to the achievement of a complete (or 
at least a partial) cure”. Thus, the term may be intended to include both 
every diagnostic procedure regarding the physical or psychological 
disorder or condition of the patient, and the administration or application 
of remedies with the aim of obtaining the alleviation or relief of symptoms 
and complications, or the cure or elimination of the aforesaid disease, 
disorder or condition. The double dimension of the concept of “treatment” 
(a practice direct to combat both physical and psychological diseases) 
allows me to include in the aforesaid definition the cases of non-therapeutic 
sterilization and cosmetic surgery. 
This wide definition includes Artificial Nutrition and Hydration 
(ANH). As emphasised by Mr. Bingham in Airedale NHS Trust -v- Bland,  
                                                          
2 W.A.N. DORLAND, Dorland's medical dictionary for health consumers, Saunders, 
Philadelphia, 2007. 
3 American Heritage medical dictionary, MA, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2007. 
4 [2011] EWHC 2420 (COP), footnote 30. 
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“the insertion of the tube is a procedure calling for skill and 
knowledge, and the tube is invasive of the patient's body to an extent 
which feeding by spoon or cup is not. An intubated patient certainly 
looks as if he is undergoing treatment, and the mechanical pumping of 
food through the tube is a highly unnatural process”5.  
 
As ANH is classed as medical treatment, it can be administrated only by 
consent or according to the best interest of the patient, and it can be refused, 
just like any other medical treatment6. 
In the Italian legal system, a binding definition of treatment has been 
developed by the considerations expressed in two judgments: one 
pronounced by the Court of Cassation, and the other made by the Council 
of State7. According to these decisions, a treatment is a set of procedures 
which are the result of a therapeutic strategy and underlying scientific 
knowledge, which are set up by doctors and continued by paramedical 
staff, consisting of the administration of chemical compounds involving 
technological procedures or the use of specific technological supports8. 
 
 
3 - Treatment, consent and “religious grounds” 
 
Every treatment requires the genuine consent of the patient or his/her 
representative. Herring summarizes the elements required in order to 
consider the consent as legally effective in this way: The consenting patient 
must be competent, sufficiently informed and not subject to coercion or 
undue influence 9. 
This raises questions about the effectiveness and genuineness of 
consent, which we will seek to answer in the next part. 
According to Appelbaum and Roth10, the “refusal of (medical) 
treatment” can be defined as follows: The "overt rejection by the patient, or 
his/her representative of medication, surgery, investigative procedures, or 
other components of hospital care recommended or ordered by the patient’s 
physician”. The rejection is a patient’s choice: When the patient does not 
                                                          
5 [1993] 2 WLR 316. 
6 E. WICKS, Human rights and healthcare, Hart Pub., Oxford, 2007, pp. 237-9. 
7 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), First Civil Section, 16.10.2007, n. 21478 and 
Consiglio di Stato (State Council), 2.9. 2014, n. 4460. 
8 Consiglio di Stato (State Council), 2.9. 2014, n. 4460 
9 J. HERRING, Medical law and ethics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014, p. 154. 
10 P.S. APPELBAUM, & L.H. ROTH, Patients who refuse treatment in medical hospitals, in 
JAMA, The Journal of the American Medical Association, 1983, 250(10), pp. 1296-1301 
(doi:10.1001/jama.1983.03340100030024, p. 1296). 
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have the autonomy or the liberty to make his/her own choice, the act of 
rejection may be performed by his/her representative. The issues linked to 
parents’ (or legal guardians’) choice to refuse - on the grounds of their 
religious beliefs - a treatment for a child are discussed below. 
The refusal of a treatment may be considered as founded on 
“religious grounds” when the motives which prompt the patient (or his/her 
legal representative) to refuse the treatment are directly and principally 
linked to a religious belief. This kind of rejection seems to be considered as 
an external expression of the freedom of religion, because it arises from a 
mental process in which the choice is interconnected with the firm belief 
that an illness can be healed through prayer and not medical healthcare11, 
or depends on an explicit or implicit prohibition to receive that treatment 
deriving from a religious legal system to which the patient belongs.  
The refusal founded on religious grounds has a strong cogency, and 
– according to article 9 of the ECHR - enjoys peculiar protection: These 
assumptions merit further consideration. 
The strong cogency of religious grounds in the choice to refuse a 
medical treatment follows on the fact that religious traditions not only teach 
ethical codes, but they have a body of laws and regulations enforced 
through social institutions12. Usually, religious beliefs are characterised by 
a set of rules intended to constrain the behaviour of the faithful: These 
precepts can be moral (their transgression does not have juridical 
consequences, but carries only an ethical reproach) or juridical. In the latter 
case, we are in front of a set of rules that must be observed by the faithful if 
they do not want to suffer sanctions or other juridical consequences. The 
systematisation of a religious juridical set of rules, together with control 
functions on their observance (and on the custody of the integrity of beliefs, 
rites, myths and symbols linked to hierophany) are functions which are 
usually carried out by organised religious groups. Hence, the legal rules of 
religions are not solely produced by hierophany in its historical 
development; rather, a key role in the normative production process is 
linked to the group's authorities. The legal rules of religions are generally 
observed by believers for three reasons. First, believers consider it right and 
proper to comply with religious law, which becomes a means of realisation 
for their own personalities; there is an intimate sharing between religious 
precepts and existential projects. The other two cases of observance of 
                                                          
11 L. PLASTINE, “In God we trust”. When parents refuse medical treatment for their children 
based upon sincere religious beliefs, in Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal, 1993, p. 124. 
12 S. FERRARI, Lo spirito dei diritti religiosi. Ebraismo, cristianesimo e islam a confronto, il 
Mulino, Bologna, 2002. 
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religious laws arise from an attitude of fear that is linked to the law’s 
infringement.13 On the one hand, they are afraid of the penalty that may be 
imposed on them by the authorities; on the other hand - especially in 
religions with a strong soteriological background - the faithful decide to 
observe religious precepts fearing that their offences will affect the eternal 
salvation of their souls. Accordingly, religious precepts have the strongest 
level of authority in the personal lives of believers, and they may create 
some problems regarding the obligation to obey the laws of the states in 
which they reside or dwell, or in which they are citizens14. 
This strongest level of authority allows us to understand why 
religion may determinate the deepest choices in a human being’s life, 
including the decision to perform or to refuse a treatment: in fact, such 
decision may be taken exclusively or predominantly in the light of rights 
and duties enshrined in a religious legal system, which represents – for 
religious people - the main landmark of the ethic. 
 
 
4 - The right to express one’s religion and medical consent 
 
Article 9 ECHR states that everyone has the right to manifest his/her own 
religion or his/her own beliefs: This freedom can be exercised in the public 
sphere through worship, teaching, practice and performing rituals. 
The ECtHR interpreted article 9 in the sense that the term 'practice' 
“does not embrace every act motivated or influenced by a religion or by a 
belief”15; rather, the Court used the hermeneutic approach set forth in the 
so-called “Arrowsmith test”16 in order to distinguish actions “intimately 
connected” by a direct link with a religion or belief from actions which were 
merely inspired or motivated by them17.  
However, it also emphasised that the state must retain the role of a 
neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of various religions, cults and 
                                                          
13 C. WEISBROD, Family, Church and State. An Essay on Constitutionalism and Religious 
Authority, J. Fam. L., 1987, 26, p. 741. 
14 H.P. GLENN, Legal Traditions of the World, Sustainable diversity in law, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2004, pp. 301 – 340. 
15 See Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, Application 7050/75, 16 May 1977. 
16 Cfr. C. EVANS, Freedom of religion under the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, pp. 111-23; R.J. AHDAR, & I. LEIGH, Religious 
freedom in the liberal state, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, pp. 166 -67. 
17 See P. CUMPER, The public manifestation of religion or belief. Challenges for a multi-faith 
society in the twenty-first century, in R. O’Dair (ed.), Law and religion current legal issues, IV, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001, p. 314. 
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beliefs, because only in this way can the public authorities fully ensure 
public order, peace and religious tolerance in a democratic society. This 
duty of neutrality and impartiality of the state ensures that  
 
“but for very exceptional cases, the right to freedom of religion as 
guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part 
of the State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used 
to express such beliefs are legitimate”18  
 
and to enforce the obligation to guarantee pluralism and genuine tolerance 
between groups and individuals holding different world views19. 
Furthermore, the Court emphasised that pluralism, tolerance and 
broadmindedness are necessary elements of a "democratic society"20. 
Democracy cannot be reduced to the constant supremacy of the opinion of 
the majority: It requires a balance that ensures that minorities can enjoy 
fundamental rights on equal footing with the majority population, so as to 
avoid the abuse of a dominant position. Pluralism and democracy must also 
be based on dialogue and a spirit of compromise, which necessarily 
involves various concessions by individuals which are justified in order to 
safeguard and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society21. 
By virtue of linking tolerance, pluralism and neutrality to religious 
freedom, the Court assumes that the right to freedom of conscience and 
religion is thus structured as a garrison to guarantee moral pluralism22: It 
prohibits a majority of citizens from unconditionally imposing a certain 
view of the world, destroying or negating the possibility of pursuing a 
heterodox ethic founded on imperatives with supreme cogency. It inhibits 
the state from supporting or blaming a confession because of its principles: 
However, it also involves the duty to fully protect religious minorities and 
to promote the exercise of moral freedom in conditions of equality. 
From this perspective, the right to express one’s own religion is a face 
of the prism of the right to express one’s own personal identity. The refusal 
of a medical treatment is a way to witness one’s own faith, and by virtue of 
                                                          
18 Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], Application 30985/96, 26 October 2000, para. 78. 
19 See Larissis and Others v. Greece, Application 23372/94; 26377/94; 26695/95, 10 July 
1998; Serif v. Greece, Application 38178/97, 14 December 1999. 
20 Murphy v. Ireland, Application 44179/98, 10 July 2003, para. 72. 
21 This approach is strongly emphasised by C.F. STYCHIN, Faith in the future. Sexuality, 
religion and the public sphere, in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2009, 29(4), pp. 729-55, esp. 
pp. 754-5. 
22 P. CUMPER, The legal regulation of new religious movements, in P. Cumper & S. 
Wheatley (eds.), Minority rights in the new Europe, Kluwer Press, Amsterdam, 1999, pp. 174-
78. 
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the relationship between human dignity and respect for every 
manifestation of identity, the freedom to witness one’s own faith must be 
guaranteed in a particular way. Such freedom is necessarily linked to ethical 
and religious pluralism: In fact, only a legal system in which individuals are 
free to become martyrs can offer real protection of the right to pursue one's 
life plan and to fully manifest one’s own identity23. 
Therefore, the freedom of individuals to martyrize themselves may 
legitimately be limited only if this freedom irreconcilably conflicts with the 
fundamental principles expressed by the Nice Treaty, the ECHR and/or the 
State Constitutions: Moreover, every limitation must always be reasonable 
and proportionate and rest on a legal basis.  
From the perspective of the ECHR, the individual right to religious 
freedom is structured as a subjective public right intended to guarantee not 
only the freedom to believe or not to believe, to belong or not belong to a 
religious group, but also the freedom to live according to one’s own 
conscience. In fact, a democratic, open and plural society must be able to 
ensure - albeit with the limitations that we will see later - the free pursuit of 
a life project through a series of choices and actions, even when they are not 
an expression of the dominant culture, but of a counterculture linked to 
religious precepts. Freedom of conscience and religion, as an individual 
right, questions the immediate relationship of individual-State and 
expresses the fundamental priority, compared to the state, of the individual 
and his/her aims in life. It guarantees every individual the opportunity of 
self-determination and being-in-the-world with their projects of life, and 
therefore, it pre-exists with respect to the rule of law, which was born and 
legitimated to protect the full development of such projects. 
As mentioned above, there is an unambiguous relationship between 
the refusal of treatment and the firm belief that an illness can be healed 
through prayer (and not medical healthcare) or the explicit or implicit 
prohibition to receive that treatment deriving from the religious legal 
system to which the patient belongs. The table below summarises some of 
the cases of treatment refusal on religious grounds reported in the scientific 
literature. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 S. CANESTRARI, Rifiuto informato e rinuncia consapevole al trattamento sanitario da 
parte di paziente competente, in S. Rodotà et al. (eds.), Il governo del corpo, Giuffrè, Milano, 
2011, pp. 1901-1906. 
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Table 1. Cases of treatment refusal on religious grounds reported in scientific 
literature 
• Firm belief that 
an illness can be healed 
through prayer and not 
medical healthcare. 
 
1. Explicit or 
implicit prohibition to receive 
that treatment deriving from 
religious legal system to which 
the patient belongs. 
 
Christian Science members24 Jehovah’s Witnesses25 
Followers of Christ26 Muslims27 
General Assembly and Church 
of the First Born members28 
Hindus29 
 Jews30 
 
 
5 - The legitimate limitations on the right to refuse a treatment on 
religious grounds 
 
As emphasised above, the freedom of individuals to refuse a procedure on 
religious grounds (and so, to become martyrs of their faith) may 
                                                          
24 C.D. HERRERA, Disputes between state and religion over medical treatment for minors, in 
Journal of Church and State, 2005, 47, pp. 823–839; J.C. MERRICK, Christian Science healing 
of minor children. Spiritual exemption statutes, first amendment rights, in Issues in Law & 
Medicine, 1994, 10(3), pp. 321-342; J. HARTSELL, Mother may I . . . live? Parental refusal of 
life-sustaining medical treatment for children based on religious objections, in Tennessee Law 
Review, 1999, 66(2), pp. 499-530 at 503- 506.  
25 R. SINGELENBERG, The blood transfusion taboo of Jehovah's Witnesses. Origin, 
development and function of a controversial doctrine, in Social Science & Medicine, 1990, 31(4), 
pp. 515-523; O. MURAMOTO, Bioethics of the refusal of blood by Jehovah's Witnesses, Part 1. 
Should bioethical deliberation consider dissidents' views?, in Journal of Medical Ethics, 1998, 24(4), 
pp. 223-230; A. MCINROY, Blood transfusion and Jehovah's Witnesses. The legal and ethical 
issues, in British Journal of Nursing, 2005, 14(5), pp. 270-274. 
26 AAP Policy Statement, Conflicts between religious or spiritual beliefs and pediatric care. 
Informed refusal, exemptions, and public funding, in Pediatrics, 2013, 132(5), pp. 962-965. 
27 Refusal towards porcine-derived medicaments, pigskin tissues in surgery, diagnostic 
procedures conducted by a male: M.A. ALBAR, Seeking remedy, abstaining from therapy and 
resuscitation. An Islamic perspective, in Saudi Journal of Kidney Diseases and Transplantation, 
2007, 18(4), p. 629. 
28 K. HICKEY & L. LYCKHOLM, Child welfare vs. parental autonomy. Medical ethics, the 
law, and faith-based healing, in Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 2004, 25, pp. 265-276 at 265. 
29 B. QURESHI, Management of ethnic Asian patients in general practice, in Transcultural 
Medicine, 1989, pp. 82-90. 
30 M.A. AINA, I. AMIN, R.N. RAJA MOHD HAFIDZ, & C.M. YAAKOB, Identification 
polypeptide biomarkers of porcine skin gelatin by two-dimensional electrophoresis, in International 
Food Research Journal, 2013, 20(3), pp. 1395-1399. 
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legitimately be limited only if this freedom irreconcilably conflicts with the 
fundamental principles expressed by the Nice Treaty, the ECHR and/or the 
State Constitutions: Moreover, every limitation must always be reasonable 
and proportionate and rest on a legal basis. 
In this legal background, drawing on an extensive range of sources 
and jurisprudence, both in the English (and Welsh)31 and in the Italian legal 
systems32, I shall set out some basic principles that guide the general issue 
of medical treatment refusal and other specific criteria devoted to 
determining the cases in which a refusal founded on religious grounds is 
lawful33. From the conjunction of these principles, four main limitations on 
the right to refuse a treatment on religious grounds may be identified: They 
can be listed as follows: 
a) The patient must be capable of refusing the treatment. Issues 
connected to this limitation will be discussed further in section 5. 
b) The refusal must be genuine and not the result of undue 
pressure on the patient. This will be developed in section 6. 
c) Competent adults are free to pronounce a genuine refusal and 
to become martyrs, but they cannot martyrize their (incompetent) minor 
children. Thus, the parents' refusal may be overruled by a superior court 
judge. This will be discussed in detail in section 7.  
d) The refusal of a competent minor can be overridden by the 
Courts when the child’s welfare is threatened by a serious and imminent 
risk that he/she will suffer grave and irreversible mental or physical harm. 
Issues connected to this limitation will be discussed further 34. 
                                                          
31 Gillick v. West Norfolk & Wisbech Area Health Authority [1985] UKHL 7; Re C 
(Adult, refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819; Re B (Adult, refusal of medical treatment) 
[2002] 2 All ER 449; Re MB (Adult, medical treatment) [1997] 38 BMLR 175 CA; Re T (Adult) 
[1992] 4 All ER 649. 
32 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), 3rd civil section, 25 July 1967, n. 1950; Corte 
di Cassazione (Cassation Court), 3rd civil section, 30 April 1996, n. 364; Corte di Cassazione 
(Cassation Court), 4th criminal section, 22 October 2005, n. 38852; Corte di Cassazione 
(Cassation Court), 1st Civil Section, 16 October 2007, n. 21748; Corte di Cassazione 
(Cassation Court), 3rd civil section, 30 July 2004, n. 14638; Consiglio di Stato (State Council), 
4th section, 2 September 2014, n. 4460. 
33 Britain: NHS Trust v. B [2014] EWHC 3486 (Fam); Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS 
Trust v. RC (2014) EWHC 1317 (COP); N (A Child) (Religion, Jehovah's Witness), Re [2011] 
EWHC 3737 (Fam); Re L (A Minor) [1998] 2 FLR 810; St George's Healthcare NHS Trust v. 
S; R v. Collins and others, ex parte S [1998] 3 All ER 673. Italy: Cagliari Assize Court, 10 
March 1982; Court of Cassation, 1st Criminal Section, 13 December 1983; Rome Assize 
Court of Appeal, 13 June 1986 Court of Vibo Valentia, 30 November 2005; Court of Rome, 
21 December 2005; Court of Treviso, 9 February 2006. 
34 Further readings on this topic in the literature: J. STAVERT, Added value. Using human 
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Equally, the jurisprudence and the literature indicate as the 
following as not being legitimate limitations: 
a) The principle of the sanctity of life. 
The principle of the sanctity of life constitutes the logical and pre-
juridical antecedent of the right to life guaranteed by Article 2 of the ECHR 
and Article 6 of the ICCPR. The recognition of the sacredness of every 
human life as a common heritage of civilisation entails, from a legal point 
of view, the prohibition of murder - implemented either by a criminal act or 
by omission -, the prohibition of the death penalty, and finally, the criminal 
responsibility for manslaughter when the death of a person is derived from 
negligence, carelessness or inexperience on the part of the agent. 
The debate continues about whether - by virtue of the recognition of 
the sanctity of life – a person who is legally capable to consent may freely 
dispose of the right to life, giving it up through suicide or by expressing 
his/her consent to an act intended to cause his/her own death (through the 
administration of a poisonous substance or by other means). It is a rather 
common heritage of European constitutionalism that the principle of self-
determination, a corollary of human dignity - allows every capable patient 
to refuse a medical treatment, even when this choice can lead to his/her 
own death35. The right to life, in fact, is not identified with the obligation to 
care at all costs. This obligation would be an expression of a vitalist ideology 
which would excessively limit individual moral freedom, and, at the same 
time, would be contrary to the right of self-determination in health: A right 
which entails, as a corollary, the need for informed consent before the 
doctor can legally perform a medical treatment. Hence, the principle of the 
sanctity of human life must yield to the principle of self-determination36.  
                                                          
rights to support psychiatric advance statements, in Edinburgh Law Review, 2013, 17(2), pp. 210-
223 (doi:10.3366/elr.2013.0155, esp. pp. 210 -212); S. BURNTON, Doctors, patients and the 
human rights act, in Medico-Legal Journal, 2011, 79(4), pp. 115-128 
(doi:10.1258/mlj.2011.011031); E. WICKS, The right to refuse medical treatment under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, in Medical Law Review, 2001, 9(1), pp. 17-40 
(doi:10.1093/medlaw/9.1.17); R. GILBAR, Family involvement, independence, and patient 
autonomy in practice, in Medical Law Review, 2011, 19(2), pp. 192-234 
(doi:10.1093/medlaw/fwr008); BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, Consent, rights and 
choices in health care for children and young people, BMJ Publishing Group, London, 2001, esp. 
pp. 109- 115, pp. 145-47. 
35 A. MACLEAN, Autonomy, consent and persuasion, in European Journal of Health Law, 
2006, 13(4), pp. 321-338 (doi:10.1163/157180906779160274). 
36 Ms B v. An NHS Hospital Trust, [2002] 2 All ER 449; Rome Tribunal, Giudice per 
l'Udienza Preliminare, 23 luglio- 17 ottobre 2007, n. 2049, Corte di Cassazione (Cassation 
Court), 1st Civil Section, 16 October 2007, n. 21748. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 29/2016 
26 settembre 2016                                                                                                  ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
11 
 
When the patient is not capable, both in the English and Italian legal 
systems, the decision-maker37 has the duty to make decisions in the best 
interest of the patient38: Hence, he/she has the duty to weigh the possible 
benefits of the refusal against its possible disadvantages39. This assumption 
will be developed further in the next section. In this section, it must be 
emphasised that emotional, welfare and social benefits and disadvantages 
should be considered in determining the best interest of the patient: Hence, 
the balancing test may even take into account the ethical and religious 
views of the patient when he/she was capable of refusing. In other words, 
religion matters in determining the best interest of the patient, and hence, 
in the doctor’s decision to limit or cease treatment for the disease of a non-
capable patient.  
Moreover, when the refusal of treatment was communicated at a 
prior date when the patient was capable of consent, the doctor has the duty 
to respect the free will of the patient, even if this can result in the latter’s 
death. 
The principle of the sanctity of life may, however, legitimate the 
overriding of a competent child’s refusal. In subsequent sections, more 
references will be provided regarding these points. 
b) The principle of respect for human dignity. 
The principle of respect for human dignity prevents anyone from 
degrading a person to an object, to a mere instrument, or to a fungible 
entity, i.e. to treat him/her as a thing or to give him/her the same (or worse) 
legal status as a non-human animal. From this principle, several sub-
                                                          
37 In the English legal system, the decision makers may be: a personal welfare attorney 
for decisions about care or treatment, the Court of Protection, the Court Appointed Deputy 
(neither the Court of Protection nor the Court Appointed Deputy may override a valid and 
applicable advance decision or a decision of an attorney in the person’s best interests), the 
most appropriate person in relation to a specific decision. See C. HUTCHINSON, J. 
FOSTER, Best interests at end of life. Practical guidance for best interests decision making and care 
planning at end of life, Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE), London, UK, 2008, p. 5. 
38 E. WICKS, Human rights and healthcare, cit. pp. 94 -105. 
39 In Italy, the Cassation Court emphasised that the guardian must, above all, act in the 
exclusive interest of the incapacitated person, reconstructing the presumed will of the 
unconscious patient and taking into account the wishes expressed by him before the loss 
of consciousness, or inferring that will from his personality, his lifestyle, his inclinations, 
his basic values and his ethical, religious, cultural and philosophical convictions. The 
principle of self-determination implies, alongside the right to choose between different 
therapies, the opportunity to reject them and interrupt them in a terminal phase of life. This 
right 'can' be freely exercised even when it leads to the sacrifice of life. See G. FERRANDO, 
Fine vita e rifiuto di cure. Profili civilistic, in In S. Rodota et al. (eds.), Il governo del corpo, cit., 
pp. 1873- 1893. 
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principles seem to descend as corollaries according to the State Members of 
the Council of Europe: the equality between men and women, the unity of 
marriage, the illegitimacy of all forms of violence in the education of 
children, the respect for the physical dimension, the prohibition of inhuman 
or degrading treatment, the freedom of entry or exit from a community, and 
the right to self-determination. 
This principle may, however, legitimate limitations on self-
determination, banning conducts which can prejudice the physical or 
psychological integrity of the person, even when he/she agrees. These 
limitations are an exception, not the rule. They are justified by a general 
ethical rejection of specific behaviours (the commercialisation of parts of the 
body, FGM) or by the will to guarantee the “core content” of the right to 
life, banning active euthanasia and assisted suicide.  
The refusal of a treatment may move the patient towards death 
(passive euthanasia) but, in such a case, the decision is not against the “core 
content” of the right to life, which must yield to the principle of self-
determination. 
A wide debate may be opened on the legitimation of the refusal in a 
case in which it could involve cruel or degrading consequences, but it is 
beyond the scope of this essay.  
 
 
6 - Capacity to refuse a treatment 
 
As pointed out in the previous section, only patients with capacity are 
entitled to refuse a treatment on religious grounds. This principle is clearly 
expressed – in the English (and Welsh) legal system – in the 2005 Mental 
Capacity Act (MCA), together with the presumption of capacity (a person 
must be assumed to have the capacity to make decisions, unless it can be 
established that he lacks capacity, section 1.2), the principle of helping in 
decision making (people must take all practicable steps to help persons to 
make their own decisions, section 1.3) and the right to make unwise 
decisions (a person who makes a decision that others think is unwise should 
not automatically be labelled as lacking the capacity to make a decision, 
section 1.4). In the Italian legal system, this principle is linked to the capacity 
to exercise rights as ruled by Article 2 of the Civil Code40, according to 
                                                          
40 Part of the Italian literature assumes that the capacity to refuse a treatment is not 
linked to article 2 of the Civil code, but rather, to the concept of “natural capacity” (the 
ability of the individual to understand the meaning of his/her own actions and the power 
to determine his/her own wishes and to develop a strategy in order to realise them). See 
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which the capacity to acquire and to exercise subjective rights and to take 
on obligations is acquired generally at 18 years old. 
According to Coggon and Miola41, “capacity” derives from the sum 
of “autonomy” and “liberty”. Autonomy relates to free will, so an 
“autonomous agent” is someone with free will, and liberty relates to the 
freedom to act without the interference of a third party. Liberty is a juridical 
dimension, which may not necessarily proceed from autonomy: It rather 
necessitates the presence of predetermined, general and abstract 
requirements which are set by parliament.  
As a first step, I will try to define the correct juridical dimension of 
the concept of “autonomy”. 
Autonomy is a personal dimension linked with awareness and self-
determination42: It requires the functioning of the mind and brain of the 
patient at such a level as to understand the implications of the medical 
information and of the refusal for his or her life43, to reason about these 
implications (also) in the future, to deliberate the refusal in accordance with 
the rules and principles of his/her own choosing and to communicate it to 
the medical staff44. 
Autonomy implies that the patient “has the rational acumen (‘mental 
capacity’) to reach a decision”, but it does not require the patient to make a 
wise (according to the common sense) decision: A patient may be 
autonomous but irrational in his/her decision to refuse. The debate 
continues regarding this assumption. 
For example, Grisso and Appelbaum (1998) point out that autonomy 
ought to be evaluated through an appreciation test. The patient’s system of 
belief, which support the decision: 
- Should not be irrational, unrealistic, or a considerable distortion of 
reality  
- Should not be the consequence of impaired cognition or affect 
- Should not be relevant for the decision45. 
                                                          
M. DOGLIOTTI, Le persone fisiche, in P. Rescigno (dir.), Trattato di diritto privato, 2, Utet, 
Torino, 1982, p. 81.  
41 J. COGGON, & J. MIOLA, Autonomy, liberty, and medical decision-making, in The 
Cambridge Law Journal, 2011, 70(3), pp. 523-547 (doi:10.1017/S0008197311000845). 
42 E. WICKS, Human rights and healthcare, cit., pp. 61-64. 
43 See J.F. DRANE, The many faces of competency, in The Hastings Center Report, 1985, 15(2), 
pp. 17-21. 
44 Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust v. RC (COP) [2014] EWCOP 1317. 
45 T. GRISSO, & P.S. APPELBAUM, Assessing competence to consent to treatment. A guide 
for physicians and other health professionals, Oxford University Press, New York, 1998, pp. 45- 
49. 
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This study fails to fully acknowledge that the right to make an 
autonomous but irrational choice about a treatment is a corollary of the 
right to manifest one’s religion: this right is protected by international law 
and may be limited so long as the limitation is prescribed by law, is 
necessary and proportionate, and pursues the interests of public safety, the 
protection of public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. Moreover, the article does not explain why the 
moral choices of a person should be considered valid only if they are caused 
by a rational thought process, when, in fact, many everyday actions are 
governed by feelings or ideas of metaphysical nature. 
A different perspective has been adopted by other scholars, who 
argue that the decision is the result of life history: it reveals personal identity 
and, at the same time, it contributes to the development of it46, opening “the 
way for compassion to those who rely on care from others”47, without 
renouncing the provision of “room for persuasion when a caregiver feels 
that his patient is at risk of relapse”48. This study acknowledges that 
religious duties are sometimes not directly linked to reasonableness, and 
that they may depend on the forcefulness of a taboo49.  
England and Wales have followed the path traced by this latter 
perspective: In fact, Section 1(4) of the MCA 2005 states: “A person is not to 
be treated as unable to make a decision merely because he makes an unwise 
decision”50. 
This choice, which was made by Parliament in the MCA, has deep 
roots in two Court decisions. 
In Re C (Adult: Refusal of Treatment)51, Mr Justice Thorpe stated that a 
paranoid schizophrenic patient at Broadmoor had the right to refuse the 
amputation of a gangrenous injured leg on the basis of his religious beliefs. 
Although the general capacity of the patient was impaired by 
                                                          
46 G. WIDDERSHOVEN, & R. BERGHMANS, Advance directives in psychiatric care. A 
narrative approach, in Journal of Medical Ethics, 2001, 27(2), pp. 92-97 (retrieved on January 
05, 2015, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27718653?ref=no-x- route:4ff8028e81dd80b 
2ec02f6854fbd4b9a). 
47 M.J. JANSSENS, Pressure and coercion in the care for the addicted. Ethical perspective, in. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 2004, 30(5), pp. 453-458 (doi:10.1136/jme.2002.002212, p. 455). 
48 M.J. JANSSENS, Pressure and coercion, cit. (2004), ibidem. 
49 R. SINGELENBERG, The blood transfusion taboo of Jehovah's Witnesses. Origin, 
development and function of a controversial doctrine, in Social Science & Medicine, 1990, 31(4), 
515-523 (doi:10.1016/0277-9536(90)90048-W). 
50 J. SAMANTA, & A. SAMANTA, Medical law, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011, 
pp. 160-161. 
51 [1994] 1 WLR 290 (FD). 
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schizophrenia, he was judged to be able to understand the nature, purpose 
and effects of the proposed medical treatment: As a consequence, he had 
the right to self-determination and to refuse the treatment on religious 
grounds, even if that would lead to his death. In Re B (Adult: Refusal of 
Medical Treatment)52, the High Court of Justice Family Division, Principal 
Registry, pointed out that a competent adult patient has the right to refuse 
to consent to any medical treatment, whether the reasons appear irrational, 
unknown or non-existent to a healthcare professional, if they make sense in 
light of the patient’s religious and personal beliefs.  
In Italy – taking into account that the Oviedo Convention on Human 
Rights and Biomedicine is not legally binding because the Italian authorities 
have failed to deposit the instrument of ratification, but that it must be used 
in the interpretation of internal rules53 - there are mainly four sources from 
which the full legal validity of an apparently unwise refusal may be 
deducted.  
First, it must be pointed out that the Italian Constitution states:  
a) There are no restrictions on personal freedom except by a 
warrant which states the reasons from a judicial authority and only in cases 
and in a manner provided for by law (art. 13); 
b) All have the right to profess freely their own religious faith in 
whatever form, individual or associate, to propagate it and to exercise it in 
private or in public cults, provided that the rites are not contrary to morals 
(art. 19); 
c) No one may be obliged to undergo a particular health 
treatment except under the provisions of the law. The law cannot under any 
circumstances violate the limits imposed by respect for the human person 
(art. 32, 2).  
Second, it must be emphasised that, in 2008, the National Bioethics 
Committee, in its opinion on “Conscious refusal and renunciation of 
healthcare in the patient-doctor relationship”54, stated that religious 
grounds may legitimate a refusal of treatment. 
Third, it can be deducted (a contrario) from art. 4-1, point 3, of the 
Ministerial Decree of 1 September, 1995, that an express refusal of a blood 
transfusion cannot be overridden, even if it is grounded on “unwise” 
reasons.  
Fourth, it must pointed out that law number 18 of 3 March 2009, 
ratifying the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
                                                          
52 EWHC 429, [2002] 1 FLR 1090. 
53 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), First Civil Section, 16 October 2007 n. 21748. 
54 http://www.governo.it/bioetica/eng/pdf/refusal_3.pdf  
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recognises the importance for the disabled of their individual autonomy 
and independence, including the freedom to make their own choices. 
According to these sources, the jurisprudence stated that doctors are 
not allowed to treat against the will of a patient. The consent of the patient 
must exist in order to consider a treatment to be lawful55, and if the refusal 
of a treatment is informed, real and current, it cannot be disregarded, even 
if it is unwise56: The patient’s right not to be treated is guaranteed, even if 
the refusal places his or her life at risk57.  
Therefore, in both England (and Wales) and in Italy, autonomy does 
not require reasonableness, but rather, an act of free will performed by a 
patient who: 
a) is able to understand, communicate, reason and deliberate, 
b) is sufficiently informed, and 
c) has fully understood all of the consequences, implications and 
operating methods of the treatment. 
This general concept of autonomy, characterized by the three 
aforesaid elements, must be now discussed as regard as the issue of the 
adult patients lacking capacity. 
Regarding the issue of the adult religious patient lacking capacity, 
the English and Welsh legal systems are based on the following principles 
expressed by the 2005 MCA: 
a) If the adult religious patient has created an effective advance 
decision which refuses the treatment, the advance decision must be 
respected (as said, even if it seems “unwise”);  
b) If the adult patient has effectively created a lasting power of 
attorney, the donee of the LPA may be able to make the decision, but only 
in the best interest of the patient; 
c) If the court has appointed a deputy, he/she can make the 
decision in the adult patient’s best interest; 
d) If there is no effective advance decision and no LPA, and no 
deputy who can make the decision, then the question is whether the 
treatment is in the best interest of the adult patient58. 
Therefore, the first main issue is to define the “best interests of a 
religious patient”, mainly if he/she belongs to a religious group which 
explicitly or implicitly bans some medical treatments, or holds the firm 
belief that an illness can be healed through prayer and not medical 
                                                          
55 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), 4th Criminal Section, 14 March 2008, n. 11335. 
56 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), First Civil Section, 16 October 2007, n. 21748. 
57 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), 3rd Civil Section, 15 September 2008, n. 23676. 
58 Sections 24 – 26 of the 2005 MCA 
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healthcare. The 2005 MCA provides a statutory checklist in order to decide 
what is in the patient’s best interest: It requires the decision to emerge from 
a balancing test between the advantages and disadvantages linked to the 
treatment from a clinical, emotional and welfare point of view. This test 
must take into account “the beliefs and values that would be likely to 
influence” the patient’s decision if he/she had capacity, but these beliefs 
and values cannot be the only factor which defines the patient’s best 
interest. Hence, when a patient lacks capacity and did not create an advance 
decision, a weakening of the central importance of the religious belief in the 
decision-making process has to be noted, taking account of the fact that a 
competent patient may refuse a treatment exclusively for religious reasons. 
This weakening may be questionable in light of the right to personal 
identity and the right of self-determination. According to Jill Marshall59, it 
must be pointed out that religious freedom is fully guaranteed only if 
everyone can pursue his/her own freely chosen lifestyle: The freedom to be 
and become the person one chooses can be limited only with regards to 
activities that are harmful/dangerous to others or to acts conflicting with 
the principle of the respect for human dignity. It does not seem so simple to 
find reasons to exclude religious patients who lack capacity from the chance 
to pursue their own lifestyles in situations which may involve treatments 
not complying with their religion, especially in cases in which - despite not 
having left an advance directive - they have always shown, by their actions, 
a strong link to the precepts of a religious belief. 
In Italy, the law is silent on the point of advance decisions. The 
Cassation Court tried to find a way to give patients the chance to have their 
will respected by enhancing the status of the Guardian (Amministratore di 
sostegno), introduced by Law n. 6 of 9 January 200460: Every person in a 
physical or mental disablement, who cannot, even partially or temporarily, 
take care of his/her own interests, can, in effect, be assisted by a Guardian, 
appointed by the tutelary judge.  
According to Article 408 of the Civil Code, every person can prepare 
a pro futuro act for the appointment of a Guardian. This act 
 a) will bind the Guardian to respect the patient’s will, and allow him 
to consent or to refuse a medical treatment; 
 b) will guide the intervention of the doctor, who has the duty to verify 
the actuality of the patient’s will (until the time of loss of consciousness, the 
patient always has the power to revoke or modify the choice made); 
                                                          
59 J. MARSHALL, Human rights law and personal identity, Routledge, Abingdon, 2014, 
pp. 176-180, 216- 218. 
60 Corte di Cassazione (Cassation Court), First Civil Section, 20 December 2012, n. 23707. 
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 c) will force the exequatur by the competent court, which has the task 
of establishing the powers to be given to the guardian, or may authorise a 
treatment on the person. 
The second main issue concerns people who suffer from Alzheimer’s 
disease or other forms of dementia, in which the cognitive status is unclear 
or fluctuates.  
People suffering from these diseases do not necessarily lack the 
capacity to make all decisions: As a corollary to the right of self-
determination and the right to make unwise decisions, they ought to be 
considered autonomous and capable of refusing a treatment until the 
moment when they cannot understand the implications of the medical 
information and of the refusal for his or her life, even if they can only retain 
the information for a short period61. 
Moreover, the patient’s right to religious freedom seems to require 
the medical staff to repeat the assessment every time he/she appears best 
able to understand and retain the information, and to use different 
communication methods which may be acceptable to him/her. 
So far this section has focussed on the concept of autonomy. 
According to Coggon and Miola62, liberty demands a focus on 
establishing whether the patient is in a rightful position to reach a legally 
binding decision (‘legal capacity’). 
Legal capacity is not necessarily linked to autonomy: for example, in 
the case of children (they can be autonomous, but not fully legally free to 
make their own decisions) and adults who want to perform or to refuse an 
act, but are not legally free to do so. 
Both in Italy and in England (and Wales), an autonomous adult 
always has the liberty to refuse a treatment on religious grounds. 
On the subject of the liberty of an autonomous adolescent, it must be 
emphasised that – in the English and Welsh legal system - the Family Law 
Reform Act 1969, section 8, states that a child aged 16 or 17 can consent to 
‘treatment’ and that such consent is to be managed in the same way as an 
adult’s consent. However, an autonomous teenager aged 16 or over actually 
has “limited freedom” to refuse a treatment for religious grounds, because 
his/her decision may be overridden by the Court in the child’s best 
interest63. Even a patient under 16 may have the liberty to reject a treatment 
on religious grounds, but this liberty is strictly linked to the patient’s 
                                                          
61 S. BINGHAM, Refusal of treatment and decision-making capacity, in Nursing Ethics, 2012, 
19(1), pp. 167-172 (doi:10.1177/0969733011431925, p. 169). 
62 J. COGGON, & J. MIOLA, Autonomy, liberty, and medical decision-making, cit., (2011). 
63 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627.  
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autonomy: The adolescent (or child) must be assessed as “Gillick 
competent” to be free to refuse, and this means that he/she must be 
considered mature and capable of fully understanding the nature of the 
treatment, the options, the risks involved and the benefits64. Moreover, it 
must be pointed out that, even in such a case, firstly (and this relates to all 
minors up to 18 years of age) even a competent child’s refusal can be 
overridden if just one of the parents consent to the treatment on the child’s 
behalf; secondly, the Court may override a minor patient’s decision (even if 
he/she is aged 16 or 1765) in order to ensure his/her physical welfare66, and 
that – when the minor patient needs urgent medical treatment to avoid 
death or serious harm - the doctor may perform that treatment even without 
the protection of a court order67. This solution raises some issues about the 
real liberty of minor patients and their best interests68: The necessary, 
indisputable connection between best interest and the execution of the 
treatment is questionable, especially when the need to safeguard the 
patient’s physical well-being compresses, absolutely, the freedom of choice 
and the ethical grounds that support the patient’s will. 
In the Simms Case, Butler-Stoss LJ pointed out that – in view of the 
1989 Children Act, which defined a child's welfare as the court's paramount 
consideration - the concept of best interest has to be assessed  
 
“in the widest possible way to include the medical and non-medical 
benefits and disadvantages, the broader welfare issue of the two 
patients, their abilities, their future with or without the treatment, the 
view of the family and the impact of refusal of the applications”69;  
 
hence, it is a multifaceted dimension of the concept of “best interest”, which 
is not exclusively and uniquely linked with the physical dimension of the 
patient, but has to be assessed, even taking into account the cultural and 
religious values of the child or the parents. 
The literature shows that this multifaceted evaluation of a child’s 
best interest in healthcare has never been taken into account. Freeman, for 
example, critically pointed out that – both in the English and in the Welsh 
                                                          
64 Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1985] 3 All ER 402. 
65 Re W (a Minor) (Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627. 
66 M. FREEMAN, Rethinking Gillick, in M. Freeman (ed.), Children's health and children's 
rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden/Boston, 2006, pp. 201-217 (205-213).  
67 Department of Health. (2009). Reference guide to consent for examination or 
treatment (2nd ed.). DH, London, p.35, para 18; p. 38, para.27. 
68 J. FORTIN, Children's rights and the developing law (3rd ed.). New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2009, pp. 155-163. 
69 Simms v. Simms and Another [2003] 1 All ER 669. 
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legal systems – “a child can say yes to medical treatment but cannot say no. 
This is the simple, indeed trite, conclusion to which one comes after an 
examination of the cases”70. Taylor emphasised an asymmetry between the 
broad guarantees provided with regard to a child’s right to consent and the 
uncertain protection of the child’s right to refuse71. The problem is that it is 
not easy to let a competent patient who is under 16 years of age become a 
martyr because of his/her own faith, although the literature has reported 
that – by virtue of article 14 of the UNCRC - autonomous children have the 
right to (religious) self-determination and to choose their (religious) 
lifestyles72: Concerning patients who are under 16 years old, the right to 
refuse a treatment is strictly connected, not only with the full awareness, 
but also with the necessity of balancing the right to self-determination with 
the duty of the State to protect vulnerable children’s lives and health from 
the results of their own actions73 and with the necessity of guaranteeing the 
genuineness of children’s refusals against forms of coercion or undue 
pressure. 
The outlined issues have been questioned extensively in the Italian 
legal system, in which the full liberty to exercise an act of refusal is acquired 
upon attaining majority74. However, according to article 6 of the Oviedo 
Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (which, as mentioned, is 
not a legally binding instrument, but a document which must be taken into 
account to correctly interpret and apply the current legislation) and article 
33 of the Code of Medical Ethics, the opinion of the minor must be taken 
into account when treatment is prescribed, as an increasingly determining 
factor of the function of the patient’s age and degree of maturity75. 
Improving and enhancing the dialogue between the medical staff, 
the child patient and his/her family is supposed to be a key issue in the 
management of this sensitive case of treatment refusal motivated by 
                                                          
70 M. FREEMAN, Rethinking Gillick, cit., p. 211. 
71 R. TAYLOR, Reversing the retreat from Gillick? R (Axon) v Secretary of State for Health, 
in Child and Family Law Quarterly, 2007, 19(1), pp. 81-97. 
72 E. VERHELLEN, Changes in the image of the child, in M. Freeman & P. Veerman (eds.). 
The ideologies of children's rights, MartinusNijhoff, The Hague, 1992, pp. 79 -94. 
73 T. SCHAPIRO, Childhood and personhood, in Arizona Law Review, 2003, 45, pp. 575-594. 
74 C. VIGNALI, La tutela della salute del minore, in Diritto di famiglia e delle persone, 2005, 
34(4), 1421-1445. 
75 L. PASCUCCI, Autodeterminazione terapeutica ed esigibilità delle cure, in M. Sesta (ed.), 
L'erogazione della prestazione medica tra diritto alla salute, principio di autodeterminazione e 
gestione ottimale delle risorse sanitarie, Maggioli Editore, Santarcangelo di Romagna, 2014, 
pp. 259-260. 
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religious beliefs and values76. The correct balance between a competent 
child’s will and the protective duty of society77 may be more easily created 
by an intercultural approach managed by the care providers; those care 
providers ought to understand if a tradition-based insecurity regarding 
certain interventions exists in the mind of the patient, recognise the kind of 
religious concerns that may disturb his/her reflection, develop the 
exchange of views between the patient and his/her family, avoid coercion 
or undue pressure on the patient, and finally, manage the process of an 
open and respectful exchange or interaction with the child, in order to help 
him/her to freely express what he/she really desires. 
In this section, it has been explained that the capacity to refuse a 
treatment on religious grounds is strictly linked to the autonomy and liberty 
of the patient … 
The section that follows moves on to consider when an act of refusal, 
given by a patient with full capacity, may be considered genuine and free, 
or rather elicited in response to pressure from another and undue. 
 
 
7 - The genuineness of consent 
 
The key question linked to the genuineness of consent is whether an act of 
refusal might be considered free if it has been given under the influence of 
the (lay, clerical, prominent) members of the religious group to which the 
patient belongs. Can this influence on the patient’s free will be considered 
undue? 
As a preliminary remark, it must be stressed that the refusal is a 
personal act, which must be performed with sufficient knowledge of its 
consequences and with the full internal freedom to choose it: It requires a 
will that must be absolutely free and not elicited in response to pressure 
from another. 
On this topic, the issue of the capacity to refuse medical treatment in 
light of the influence of a third party on the patient’s decision must be 
discussed. With regard to the English legal system, in Re T (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment) [1993]78, Judge Donaldson stressed that the real question – in 
                                                          
76 L. HAGGER, The child as vulnerable patient. Protection and empowerment, Ashgate, 
Farnham, 2009, p. 53. 
77 A. GRUBB, Refusal of treatment (child): competence -- Re L (Medical Treatment: Gillick 
Competency)., in MedIcal Law Review, 1999, 7(1), pp. 58-61. 
78 [1993] Fam 95, 113. 
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understanding whether or not the refusal depends on a genuine decision - 
is  
 
“Does the patient really mean what he says or is he merely saying it 
for a quiet life, to satisfy someone else or because the advice and 
persuasion to which he has been subjected is such that he can no longer 
think and decide for himself?”  
 
I n other words: “Is it a decision expressed in form only, not in reality?” 
It has been emphasised that a tired, in pain or depressed patient may 
be very weak and vulnerable to external influences, which are capable of 
substantially diminishing the patient’s freedom of will, and that the 
deference towards those to whom the patient is bound by a strong bond 
founded on piety, respect and (or) honour may force him to express a 
decision that is contrary to his/her own real will. Therefore, in these 
circumstances, the medical staff should be very careful in considering 
whether the refusal is genuine.  
In Re T (Adult: Refusal of Treatment) [1992]79, the Court decided that a 
20-year-old pregnant woman who had been injured in a wreck and had 
rejected the required blood transfusions lacked free will, because her 
treatment refusal had been given under her mother’s (a practising Jehovah's 
Witness) pressure (and under the influence of drugs). Therefore, the Court 
stated that the patient’s decision had to be overridden. 
The general rule on this topic is that a patient’s refusal of a particular 
treatment is not valid if it is expressed under undue influence, i.e. 
psychological pressure exerted by another person for which the patient 
feels reverence or who is linked to the patient by trust or confidence, which 
compelled the latter to refuse the treatment against his or her own will. 
Turning to the Italian legal system, it can be seen that there is no 
explicit solution for this problem. However, it must be emphasised that the 
National Bioethics Committee has stated that the refusal or renunciation of 
the therapies by an autonomous and competent patient is legally legitimate 
when the patient is exercising his/her own free will, is self-conscious and 
aware of his/her own condition, as well as thoroughly informed about the 
illness and the consequences deriving from the acceptance or 
refusal/renunciation of the therapies80. A contrario, it may be stressed that a 
lack of free will caused by undue pressure may invalidate the patient’s 
refusal. 
                                                          
79 [1992] 4 All ER 64.  
80 http://www.governo.it/bioetica/eng/pdf/refusal_3.pdf  
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This assumption seems to be broadly confirmed by taking into 
account that the refusal ought to be considered as a unilateral legal act of 
private autonomy, a manifestation of free will that is directed to the 
production of legal effects, by which patients express their will to exercise, 
in a specific way, the self-determination granted to them by the law81. As a 
legal act of private autonomy, the refusal is valid if it is free from error, 
duress and fraud, although the concept of duress, in Italian private law, 
must “amount to a serious and unjustified threat, that is, one sufficient (…) 
to provoke fear in a reasonable person in order to be grounds for 
violability”82, and, as such, it excludes reverential fear.  
The Italian approach to the issue of the influence of the members of 
the religious group to which the patient belongs on his/her decision to 
refuse the treatment seems very different from that of the English (and the 
Welsh). The latter seems to give preference to the effective genuineness of 
refusal against every kind of pressure, implicit or explicit; the first seems to 
consider only a kind of pressure exercised through an overt threat as legally 
relevant. 
It is questionable whether the Italian approach is appropriate: It does 
not seem adequate to guarantee the right of self-determination in healthcare 
for patients who belong to religious “encompassing groups” which heavily 
restrict the personal lives of their members.  
According to Margalit, an encompassing group can be defined as “a 
competing group, in the sense that anyone belonging to it cannot in 
principle belong to another encompassing group [at] the same time”83. 
Some religious groups can surely be defined as “encompassing”: 
They do not usually permit double or multiple membership, and their 
competing vision of society causes their members to be unable to 
understand and accept the inclusive nature of a liberal society. Moreover, 
some of them heavily restrict the lives of their own members: These groups 
are structured as legal systems and impose a large set of rules upon their 
members, which can cause them to be unable to fully express and foster 
                                                          
81 C. CASTRONOVO, Il negozio giuridico dal patrimonio alla persona, in Europa e diritto 
privato, 2009, 87, pp. 100-103. 
82 G. ALPA, & V. ZENO-ZENCOVICH, Italian private law, Routledge-Cavendish, 
Abingdon, 2007, p. 165. 
83 A. MARGALIT, The decent society, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1996, 
p. 177. 
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their own personal individual identities84. In this case, a clash between 
individual identity and group identity could be found85.  
It must be observed, in this regard, that the right to freedom of choice 
in healthcare must be ensured, even (and especially) when it is denied by 
the social group to which the patient belongs, because - according to the 
approach of the Court of Strasbourg-ethical pluralism must be guaranteed 
to all individuals, and therefore, also to the faithful of various 
denominations, who are considered both uti singuli and as members of 
social groups having a religious purpose. 
According to these premises, the evidences of this study suggest that 
a democratic pluralistic legal system, based on the respect of human rights, 
must prevent situations in which patients manifest a will to refuse a 
treatment only because of the pressure of group members and/or because 
of the fear of being banned from the group to which they belong and losing 
every kind of support offered by it.  
Therefore, in my opinion, in order to assure that an act of will by an 
adult, competent patient who refuses a treatment for religious reasons is 
really free and has not been subjected to undue influence, a test ought to be 
passed. Table 2 describes a test proposal and its assessments. 
 
Table 2. Test proposal to evaluate the genuineness of treatment refusal in 
competent religious adult patients.  
Is the patient 
religious? 
No=0 
Believer=1 
Practising believer =2 
Comment: The disclosure of 
religious association and/or of 
religious beliefs constitutes 
sensitive data, which may be used 
only when necessary for medical 
purposes and the processing is 
done by a health professional or a 
person with an equivalent duty of 
confidentiality. In case of refusal of 
treatment, a patient’s religious 
convictions may be a key issue in 
the choice of medical strategy, and 
it may be the first step in order to 
understand the genuineness of the 
patient’s choice. 
 
                                                          
84 J. SPINNER-HALEV, Surviving diversity. Religion and democratic citizenship, Johns 
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2000, pp. 2-6. 
85 E. VITALI, Legislatio libertatis e prospettazioni sociologiche nella recente dottrina 
ecclesiasticistica, in Il Diritto Ecclesiastico, 1980, 91(1), pp. 58- 64. 
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Is the 
patient tired, in pain 
or depressed? 
Rating scale from 0 to 3 
based on empirical 
observations and 
health data. 
Comment: The more the patient is 
in pain, tired or depressed, the 
more he/she may be subjected to 
undue pressure with the view of 
forcing him/her to refuse the 
treatment against his or her own 
will. 
Can the group to 
which the patient 
belongs be 
considered 
encompassing and 
as restricting the 
lives of its own 
members? 
Rating scale from 0 to 3 
based on scientific 
contributions 
regarding the attitude 
of the group. 
Comment: A considerable amount 
of literature has been published on 
the history, practices and legal 
systems of the religious groups 
present in Europe. These studies 
may clarify the position of every 
single group towards the inclusive 
nature of liberal society and 
towards the relationship between 
individual self-determination and 
the rules on which the group 
operates. The more the group 
denies the inclusive nature of 
liberal society and compels 
individual autonomy, the more 
the patient may be subjected to 
undue pressure. 
Did the aforesaid 
group offer its moral 
or material support 
to the patient? 
Rating scale from 0 to 3 
based on patient 
history. 
Comment: The physician may 
investigate facts about the 
patient's personal life which are 
relevant to the medical assistance 
provided, for example, concerning 
moral or material support offered 
to the patient by the group to 
which he/she belongs. The more 
the group is/was supportive to the 
patient, the more the patient may 
be subjected to undue pressure. 
Is the treatment 
against the religious 
law which governs 
the group? 
No=0 
It is not recommended, 
but it is lawful =2 
Yes=3 
Comment: In this test, it is 
“against the religious law which 
governs the group” if both every 
treatment is banned or not 
recommended, both treatments 
are considered as disallowed on 
the ground of the doctrinal idea 
that illness can be healed through 
prayer (and not medical 
healthcare). 
Has someone in the 
group cooperated 
with the patient in 
order to understand 
Rating scale from 0 to 3 
based on empirical 
observations and 
patient history. 
Comment: Investigations are 
required in order to clarify 
whether the informed decision-
making process has been 
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the treatment and to 
make a decision 
regarding it? 
developed in cooperation with a 
third party which is member of the 
group to which the patient 
belongs. This cooperation is not 
per se unlawful, but the medical 
staff must investigate the real and 
concrete influence of the patient’s 
advisor(s). 
What is the 
relationship 
between the 
decision co-operator 
and the patient? 
Rating scale from 0 to 3 
based on patient 
history. 
Comment: The more the 
relationship between the patient 
and his/her advisor is 
characterised by trust or 
confidence, the more the patient 
feels reverence for the advisor, the 
more he/she may be subjected to 
undue pressure. 
 
In case of a positive answer to question n. 1 and if the value of the 
answer n. 5 is > 0, a total final score ≥ 15 could show undue influence.  
Furthermore, in addition to the aforesaid test, in the Italian legal 
system, the concept of “reverential fear” may be taken into account in order 
to enable a real evaluation of possible undue influence.  
Both the proposed test and a serious inquiry on the presence of an 
undue influence/reverential fear in the mind of the patient could be 
critiqued as unlawful: It could be argued that both of these survey issues 
require a treatment of sensitive data (concerning the patient’s religious 
opinions and beliefs) that is not permitted by the law. However, this 
criticism does not take into account that EU Directive 95/46/EC - the Data 
Protection Directive - states that ‘sensitive personal data’ can be processed  
 
“without specific consent if it is required for the purposes of preventive 
medicine, medical diagnosis, the provision of care or treatment or the 
management of health care services, and where those data are 
processed by a health professional subject to the obligation of 
professional secrecy or by another person also subject to an equivalent 
obligation of secrecy”. 
 
This principle has been confirmed in the legal system of the UK by 
schedule 3.8 of the Data Protection Act 1998 (the treatment of the data 
linked to Medical Confidentiality). 
In Italy, Article 20 of Legislative Decree 196/2003 provides that 
public bodies may process sensitive and judicial data if the treatment is 
authorised by an express provision of the State law that emphasises the 
categories of operation that may be performed, as well as the substantial 
public interest pursued. 
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Moreover, article 85 of the aforesaid decree emphasises that the 
activities falling within the scope of the tasks committed to the National 
Health Service and other public health care bodies shall be considered to be 
in the substantial public interest when the process is performed in order to 
reach certain specific purposes.  
Therefore, in the healthcare sector, sensitive data concerning 
religious beliefs can be processed for administrative activities related to the 
prevention, diagnosis, care and rehabilitation of the persons assisted by the 
National Health Service (including foreigners and Italian citizens abroad) 
and as regards the planning, management, control and assessment of 
medical treatments. The specific regulation for which the data are actually 
required in each case is explicitly regulated by schedules which should be 
adopted by every Region in accordance with the opinion of the Privacy 
Ombudsman. 
 
 
8 - Refusal and children’s best interest 
 
As described on the previous pages England, Wales and Italy, the legal 
responsibility to make decisions regarding the healthcare of younger 
children who lack sufficient understanding and intellectual capacity is 
generally upon their parents or guardians. This responsibility includes the 
right to make everyday choices regarding the children’s health and to 
participate – in agreement with healthcare professionals or with the 
intervention of the court –in decisions regarding medical treatments for 
their children86. Hence, an absolute right of the parents to refuse treatments 
for their children on religious motivations is groundless: The refusal may 
be overridden by the Court in order to promote the child’s best interest87.  
As discussed above, a child’s best interest in healthcare has a 
multifaceted dimension which transcends the physical dimension of 
integrity to embrace the principles and values that underpin the personality 
of the patient and the ideological background of his/her parents. 
Hence, it may be pointed out that the best interest of an incompetent 
child is strictly related to his/her own welfare: But what constitutes a child’s 
welfare? 
From a theoretical point of view, it is a child’s welfare in a mosaic-
concept, i.e. a combination of various elements like his/her ascertainable 
                                                          
86 J. BRIDGEMAN, Because we care? The medical treatment of children, in S. Sheldon & M. 
Thomson (eds.), Feminist perspectives on healthcare law, Cavendish, London, 1998, p. 100. 
87 J. SAMANTA, & A. SAMANTA, Medical law, cit. (2011), pp. 253-256. 
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wishes and feelings, his/her physical, emotional and educational needs, 
and his/her religious background. Hence, according to Sheldon, “what 
truly constitutes the ‘welfare’ of the child is a matter of perspective”: it has 
been emphasised that “the notion of ‘‘best interest’’ is inherently a question 
of values and most parents believe they are making a decision in the best 
interest of their child. Parents who are Jehovah’s Witnesses, for example, 
may truly believe that they are making a decision in the best interest of their 
child when they refuse to consent to a blood transfusion. Loss of salvation 
is not, after all, a trivial consequence of acting on the physician’s 
recommendation”88. 
In the end, however, there is a kernel in this mosaic-concept: the 
medical staff and the state powers have “to ensure that children ultimately 
become adults, able to decide, independently, what is in their own best 
interest”, thus legitimising the overriding of a refusal that could expose the 
child to the danger of death.  
This kernel is deeply rooted in article 6 of the UNCRC, which does 
not simply guarantee “the inherent right to life” of every child, but also 
states that “States Parties shall ensure to the maximum extent possible the 
survival and development of the child”, thus legitimising the ban of every 
behaviour that is linked to activities endangering the child’s health, which 
is considered to be an objective and supreme value. Article 6 of the UNCRC 
goes beyond the provision of article 2 of the ECHR, because it generates a 
legal duty on the State parties to provide all of the positive measures 
directed at prolonging children’s lives to the maximum extent and to assure 
the full development of their personality “both from a material and spiritual 
point of view”. This hermeneutical approach creates many questions 
regarding the laws allowing terminally ill children to die, but that is not the 
topic of this essay: It surely makes parents’ (or guardians’) decisions which 
may damage the health and safety of their children unlawful, regardless of 
the reasons on which they are grounded. Even a refusal grounded on 
cultural and religious reasons may be overridden, because Protocol 1, 
Article 2 of the ECHR enshrines a right to religious education that must be 
constrained in order to assure the absolute and unequivocal 
implementation of Article 6 of the UNCRC. 
Hence, it could be argued that the general principle governing 
parents’ (or guardians’) right to refuse – on religious grounds - treatments 
                                                          
88 D.S. DIEKEMA, Parental refusals of medical treatment. The harm principle as threshold for 
state intervention, in Theoretical Medicine, 2004, 25(4), p. 246. 
 Stato, Chiese e pluralismo confessionale 
Rivista telematica (www.statoechiese.it), n. 29/2016 
26 settembre 2016                                                                                                  ISSN 1971- 8543 
 
29 
 
for their children is the same as that expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the case Prince v. Massachusetts (although it addressed a different subject):  
 
“[P]arents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not 
follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of 
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal 
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves”89.  
 
In other words, no one can become a witness of his/her religious faith by 
seriously endangering the mental or physical welfare of his/her own child: 
Hence, a refusal of medical treatment to a child, given by parents or 
guardians on religious grounds, must be overridden when it may expose 
the child’s health to an unnecessary and imminent risk.  
In Italy, this approach has been confirmed by the Supreme Court in 
the Oneda case: In order to avoid the ban of the Jehovah's Witness faith, Mr 
and Mrs Oneda refused to allow their daughter to undergo periodic blood 
transfusions which were necessary for her survival. When the girl died, the 
Court clearly affirmed the unlawfulness of the parents’ or guardians’ 
refusal of treatment – even grounded on religious motivations - when it was 
necessary for the protection of the child’s life. Hence, Mr and Mrs Oneda 
were judged responsible for the crime of manslaughter90. 
From this perspective, it seems very difficult to find legislative 
solutions which may generate a “religious accommodation” in order to 
allow parents to choose their favourite healthcare plan: Medical staff (if it is 
possible) ought, however, to try to create a dialogue with the patients and 
the parents, with the aim of avoiding a court’s intervention and determining 
all of the possible ways to receive the parents’ consent or – at least – to 
perform the treatment in a way that tries to avoid emotionally scarring the 
family.  
However, it is questionable whether the principle of the “non-
martyrization of children patients” can legitimate the parents’ refusal of a 
treatment which may, in the future, prevent the child from incurring serious 
injuries when the refusal does not expose the child to an unnecessary and 
imminent risk: A good example of this topic is represented by the refusal of 
a vaccine by a parent. 
On this issue, it must emphasised that childhood vaccination is not 
compulsory in the UK, while, in Italy, some vaccinations (against 
Diphtheria, Hepatitis B, Polio and Tetanus, to be precise) are –in general - 
                                                          
89 U.S. Supreme Court. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
90 S. CANESTRARI, Rifiuto informato e rinuncia consapevole al trattamento sanitario da 
parte di paziente competente, in S. Rodotà et al. (eds.), Il governo del corpo, cit., pp. 1908-09. 
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part of the national immunisation plan and mandatory for every new-
born91. In the latter case, the parents’ responsibility to immunise their 
children responds to an interest of the community: Hence, even if the 
refusal of mandatory vaccinations does not expose the child to an 
unnecessary and imminent risk, the general interest in public health 
prevails over parents’ and guardians’ beliefs.  
On the other hand, a recommended (but not compulsory) 
vaccination, which is not linked to a superior and general interest, may be 
freely refused by the parents: However, it must be emphasised that 
immunisation should not be included in that "small group of important 
decisions"92 which should only be made if there has been an agreement 
between everyone who has parental responsibility for the child93 because of 
the connection – underlined by the courts – between it and the welfare of 
the child. Hence, in light of the aforesaid connection, in case of disputes 
between parents, the best interest of the children is to receive the vaccine, 
even overriding (if they are under 16) the parents’ different opinions94. 
In such cases, however, a religious accommodation for religious 
parents may be found. For example, pharmaceutical companies may be 
obliged to use gelatines or other added ingredients which minimise 
religious issues or concerns95. 
 
 
9 - Conclusive remarks 
 
Religion matters, even in medical law. The “tragic choices” made by 
patients to sacrifice their lives on the altar of the obedience to a set of 
religious rules are only one of the faces of a prism which medical and 
paramedical staffs are – very often– compelled to confront.  
The “disenchantment” of Europe and its increasing secularisation 
are very far from destroying the persistence of religion in a certain part of 
the population, which adopts lifestyles and behaviours strongly linked to a 
                                                          
91 M. HAVERKATE, F. D’ANCONA, C. GIAMBI, K. JOHANSEN, P.L. LOPALCO, V. 
COZZA, et al., Mandatory and recommended vaccination in the EU, Iceland and Norway. Results 
of the VENICE 2010 survey on the ways of implementing national vaccination programmes, in 
Eurosurveillance, 2012, 17, pp. 1-6. 
92 J (A Minor) (Prohibited Steps Order, Circumcision), Re [1999] 2 FLR 678. 
93 F v. F [2013] EWHC 2683. 
94 F v. F [2013] EWHC 2683. 
95 For the UK, see the 2013 vaccines and gelatine: PHE response (https://www.gov.uk/go 
vernment/news/vaccines-and-gelatine-phe-response 
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confessional set of rules96 and wants to perform them, even ahead of a 
medical treatment97. Moreover, taking religious freedom seriously means – 
among other things – that the genuine refusal of medical treatments on 
religious grounds, expressed by a competent adult, must be guaranteed 
without any doubt. This freedom is necessarily linked to ethical and 
religious pluralism: In fact, only a legal system in which the individual can 
freely choose between science and religion can offer real protection for the 
right to pursue one's life plan and to fully develop one’s personality. 
At the same time, a secular State which really wants to take religious 
freedom seriously has the duty to protect children against every abuse of 
their parents’ (or guardians’) right to religious freedom and to religious 
education, the duty to verify the genuineness of the refusal, and the duty to 
avoid – if possible and to the maximum extent – a clash between a patient’s 
religious conscience and the treatment which is necessary in a specific case. 
This – as emphasised above – requires the provision of concrete 
obligations on the pharmaceutical industry: However, a medical and 
paramedical staff that is expert in religious issues and competent in an 
intercultural dialogue with the patient (and with his/her parents or 
guardians) may also be very important in avoiding the aforesaid clash. 
Concerning the latter issue, it has been emphasized above that, both 
in England (and Wales) and in Italy, every person has the right to receive 
appropriate information on the nature and possible development of a 
treatment in which he/she is involved, as well as any alternative therapies.  
This information should be as comprehensive as possible in order to 
ensure a free and conscious choice on the part of the patient and, therefore, 
to guarantee his/her own self-determination: It ought to be substantiated 
by detailed explanations, and it should be appropriate for the cultural level 
of the patient, expressed in a language that takes into account the particular 
subjective state of the patient and the degree of knowledge at his disposal. 
Most of all, it ought to be dialogic, expressed through communication codes 
that are not only appropriate for the patient’s intellectual capacity, but also 
for the specificities of the ethnocultural group to which the patient belongs. 
To sum up, in a case of a refusal of treatment motivated on religious 
grounds, it is to be hoped that the medical and paramedical staff is able to 
initiate and manage an intercultural process that promotes exchange and 
                                                          
96 J. DE HART, P. DEKKER, & L.C.J.M. HALMAN, (eds.), Religion and civil society in 
Europe, Springer, Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London, 2013.  
97 L. LINNARD-PALMER, Parents' refusal of medical treatment for cultural or religious 
beliefs. An ethnographic study of health care professionals' experiences, in Journal of Pediatric 
Oncology Nursing, 2005, 22(1), pp. 48-57 (doi:10.1177/1043454204270263). 
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interaction, through a cross-cultural dialogue. The aim of this dialogue 
ought to be the translation of medical language into a language which can 
be fully understood by the patient, and the creation of a reciprocal 
comprehension between the (mainstream) ethnocultural communication 
codes and instances of the staff and the (nondominant) ethnocultural (and 
religious) communication codes and instances of the patient (and of his/her 
parents and legal guardians).  
 
 
 
ABSTRACT: This study focuses on the right of patients to refuse medical treatments on 
religious grounds and on the (supposed) right to the parents to refuse medical treatments 
on behalf of their children, emphasizing the links and connections between the freedom of 
religion, the right to self-determination and the right to refuse medical treatment based on 
religious motivations. After a comparison between the norms devoted to rule the exercise 
of these rights in the English (and Welsh) and Italian legal systems, the article suggests that 
the approach of medical staff towards a Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious 
Grounds ought to start an intercultural process. This process ought to be a cross-cultural 
dialogue devoted not only to translate medical language in a language which can be fully 
understood by the patient, but also to create a reciprocal comprehension between the 
(mainstream) ethnocultural communication codes and instances of the staff and the 
(nondominant) ethnocultural (and religious) communication codes and instances of the 
patient (or of his/her parents).  
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